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A cursory glance at new titles in U.S. political history may give 
the impression that "all the past is political culture," and that this 
intuitively sensible formula is "casually invoked" by writers casting 
about for theoretical support. Admittedly, some users have turned 
political culture into an elastic category. The Encyclopedia ofAmeri­
,can Social History, for example, expansively claims political culture 
for both the "new social history" and the ~'new political history." 
A recent survey of the Organization of American Historians finds 
that nine ofthe top ten "mo~t influential" books can be considered 
"inquiries into the nature of American political culture," even 
though none of these classic works_ ever invoked the concept by 
name. Political culture might be an example of what Thompson 
called "a clumpish term, which by gathering so many activities 
and attributes into one common bundle may actually confuse or 
disguise discriminations that should be made between them:" 
Absent a clear definition and intellectual genealogy, "political 
culture" threatens to obscure more than it reveals. 1 
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Despite this danger, historians should not turn their backs on 
political culture. Recent works like Etcheson's Emerging Midwest 
suggest that the concept possesses great analytical utility. Others 
like Wiebe's Self-Rule, however, underscore the need for more 
discipline· in using it. Beyond casual invocation, historians of 
political culture would. do well to acquaint themselves with the 
., intellectual genealogy of the concept-not least because it teaches 
a rare lesson in how to make theoretical contributions to other 
disciplines. Political culture originated as an analytical tool for 
political scientists using quantitative-behavioralist methods, but 
historians have so enriched the concept with theories of cultural 
interpretation that now "one can see gro\,lnds for reborrowing by 
political scientists of the concept originally borrowed from them." 
There is nothing new about historians pilfering ideas, but, in this 
insta11-ce, historians are not exporters of a precious theoretical 
commodity, gaining unaccustomed leverage in the interdiscipli­
nary balance of trade. Furthermore, while political scientists have 
come to accept that historically derived "cultural beliefS," not just 
systemic "variables," affect political outcom historians have es­
tablished that the intersection of politics an culture was a vital 
part of the American past. 2 
The concept of political culture evolved from centuries of gen­
eralizing about power's different faces in different places. Plato's 
"dispositions," Montesquieu's "spirit of the laws," Jean-Jacques 
Rousse~u's "mores," David Hume's "manners," Alexis de Toc­
queville's "habits of the heart," Emile Durkheim's "collective con­
sciousness," and Max Weber's "authority systems" were all 
ancestors to the concept. Earlier in this century, American social 
scientists began asking how the unique "psychological coherence" 
or "modal personality" of a culture might affect its politics. 
Laswell7s call for "extend[ing) the scope of political investigation 
to include the fundamental features of the cultural setting" helped 
loose a flood ofso-called "national character." studies in the 1940s. 
These works placed whole countries on the couch, linking sup­
posedly essential traits to the resolution of collective psycho­
2 Stephen Welch, The Conapt of Political Culture (New York, 1993), 148; Lawrence C. 
Dodd and Calvin Jillson (eds.), Th~ Dyrulmics ofAmerican Politics: Approaches and Interpretations 
(Boulder, 1994), 2. See also Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, CJ4ltr4ral 
Theory (Boulder, 1991). 
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d . The resulting neo-Freudian interpretations of culture 
were imaginative and often frivolous, such as the theory of 
"diaperology" that ascribed Soviet foreign policy to Russian swad­
dling practices. At best, national character studies lapsed into 
hereditarian determinism; at worst, they reified crude stereotypes. 
Political scientists concluded from this early misadventure that 
cultural theory must rely on "observations systematically made and 
recorded by trained social scientists" armed with the rigorously 
empirical methods of quantitative behavioralism. 3 
The modem-day concept of political culture was born amid 
Cold War efforts to distinguish the "Free World" from · the rest 
of the world. In a landmark 1956 essay, Aimond contrasted the 
"pragmatic" politics of Britain and the United State'S with the 
"simplism" of totalitarian states. This Manichean dichotomy ap­
pealed to postwar political scientists who hoped that comparative 
theory would help spread the blessings of American democracy 
and stem the tide of communism. But Almond's research agenda 
oudasted the Cold War: "Every political system is embedded in 
a particular pattern oforientations to political action. I have found 
it useful to refer to this as the political culture." With this single 
stroke, he offered a convenient catchphrase for such loosely con­
ceptualized termS in comparative politics as attitudes, values, ideol­
ogy, and socialization. It bore an obvious affinity to Weber's 
recendy translated theory of Protestantism as the cultural engine 
ofmodernization. The problem for political scientists was how to 
J Harry Eckstein, ..A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present," in idm1 and 
David E. Apter (eds.), Comparati~ Politics: A I«adn (New York, 1963); Gabriel A. Almond, 
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a Dis14111a (Chicago, 1953); Mead, "National Character," in Alfred L. Kroeber (ed.), Anthro­
pology Tod4y: An Etrcydoptdit ln~tory (Chicago, T9SJ); Mead, And Kttp Your Powdtr Dry : 
An Antlwpologist I..oolts at Amtric4l (New York, 1942); Ruth Benedict, TM Chrysanthnnum 
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in NatUmlll Clwatttr (New York, 1948); itkrn and John Rickman, Tltt Pfoplt tf Grrat Russia 
(London, 1949); Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses About Political Acts, " World 
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of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems,". in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson 
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apply ·Almond's idea-how to identify, measure, and compare the 
"pattern of orientations" that characterized politics in different 
nations. The solution came from another field ofpostwar political 
science, namely, psephology, or the study of voting behavior.4 
Psephologists at the time were busily using the sample-survey 
methods of opinion pollsters and market researchers to explore 
"how the voter makes up . his mind." Inspired by this work, 
regarded at the time as methodologically sophisticated, Almond 
teamed with Verba to survey thousands of citizens in five nations. 
In The Civic Culture (1963}, Almond and Verba vowed to develop 
"a scientific theory of democracy" by "codify[ing] the operating 
characteristics of the democratic polity itself." In prac.tice, how­
ever, they simply measured "attitudes toward the political system, 
in various places and called the result political culture. The authors 
made startling discoveries-for example, that 85 percent ofAmeri­
cans expressed pride in their government, compared with 7 per­
cent of Germans and 3 percent of Italians. But critics questioned 
the "psychologically reductionistic" use of poll data to sum up 
individual attitudes, given that culture was a group phenomenon, 
protesting that "political culture [was] the prope~ of a collectiv­
ity." "Individuals have beliefs, values, and attitudes, but they do 
not have cultures." Evidently, there was a difference between 
answering questionnaires, which reflected diffuse opinions, and 
constituting a polity, which reflectS" historical evolution, intersub­
jective understanding, and collectively negotiated (and contested) 
meanings.5 
4 Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, XVIII (1956), 31~409; 
Terence Ball, "American Political Science in Its Postwar Political Context," in James Farrand 
Raymond Seidelman (eds.), Discipline and History: Political Sdma in the United States (Ann 
Arbor; 1993); Almond. "Comparative Political Systems," 96; Weber (trans. Talcott Parsons), 
TM Prottstllnt Ethic and tM Spirit ofCapitalism (New York, 1958). The tenn "political culture" 
appeared earlier in Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, Soviet Communism: A New Civiliz ation? 
(New York. 1936). 
5 Paul F. Lazanttid, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice: How the Voter 
Mmm Up His MiNI in a Prtsidmti41 Campt~ign (New York, 1944); Berelson, Lazenfeld, and 
William N . McPhee, Voting: A Study ofOpinion Formation in a Presidential Campt~ign (Chicago, 
I9So4); ~Campbell, Philip E. Convene, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The 
Amtrica Votn (New York. 1C)6o); Almond and Verba, The ' Civic Culture: Political Attitudes 
lltld Dtmoaacy in Fiw Nations (Princeton, I96J), u , s. IJ, 102. On the methodological context, 
see Carnpbdl and George Katona, "The Sample Survey: A Technique for Social Science 
Research," in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (eds.), Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences 
(New York, I9SJ). Lowell Dittmer, "The Comparative Analysis of Political Culture," Amni­
lwtudim, XXVII (1982), 20; David). Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search 
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Almond and Verba had completely omitted history and poli­
tics from their construction of political culture. They presumed 
that . polls measure timeless cultural attributes; instead, they may 
simply record ephemeral opinions about a particular regime at a 
particular time. Almond and Verba seemed to imply that political 
culture never changed and never varied . internally. Marxists ob­
jected that The Civic Culture ignored class and power relations, 
and many detractors raised the red flag ofnormative bias: Almond 
and Verba seemed to idealize the "moderate" civic culture of 
Anglo-American liberal democracy that other benighted countries 
' lacked.6 
The worst flaw in the original political culture concept was 
its chicken-egg conundrum of cause and effect: Did civic culture 
create democracy-or did democracy create civic culture? As an 
explanatory model, political culture seemed tautological; structure 
rather than culture could well account for democratic success, 
rendering the civic culture just another dependent variable. Potter 
had earlier suggested, an alternative explanation that American 
democracy was rooted not in civic culture but in economic 
"abundance." Almond later showed signs of agreeing with him.7 
Before long, Verba admitted to having written "a bold and 
incautious book." He redefined political culture as "beliefS, ex­
pressive symbols, and values" that required interpretation as well 
as measurement. He tried to be more specific about "what aspects 
of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparatiw Politics, XI (1979}, 129. 
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Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Selip>n. "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question 
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of political culture are determinants of what phenomena," repo­
sitioning the concept as the "link between the events of politics 
and the behavior of individuals." Verba allowed for cultural 
changes that could shape or be shaped by politics, for class-specific 
versions of a culture, and for subcultures within a polity. In a 
volume dedicated to Almond, he offered his "broad and rather 
loose definition" to answer their critics, and Pye, his new collabo­
rator, soon followed with a similarly inclusive definition that 
stretched political culture from "the collective history ofa political 
system" to ''the life histories of the members of that system," 
creating a link between "public events and private experiences." 
Thus, the political culture concept acquired its "kitchen sink" 
reputation, eliciting criticism that it described everything about 
politics "without explaining anything" and turned "abstract ide­
alizations" into uncaused causes. Dissatisfied political scientists 
implored their colleagues to "stop using political culture as a handy 
residual variable to explain phenomena we cannot think of other 
ways to deal with. •>S 
Political culture's wash-out left comparative politics in what 
Wiarda called "a state of crisis," woefully lacking "a single global 
and integrating theoretical framework." Accordin,g to Laitin, "The 
systematic study of politics and culture [was] m<fribund. "9 
The underappreciated concept emerged again in another 
branch of the political-science family, the study of American 
government. Patterson suggested treating regions of the United 
States as mini-nations with distinct political cultures, and Elazar 
soon emerged as the leader of this project. For him, political 
8 Verba, "On Revisiting The Civic Culture: A Personal Postscript, " in Almond and idem 
(eds.), Cillic Culture &visited, 394; idem, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye 
and idnn (eds.}, Political Culture and PolitiCJJI Dn!elopment (Princeton, 1965}, 513-518; Pye, 
"Politital Culture," in David L. Sills (ed.}, lntmratiorud Encydopedia of the Social Sciences (New 
York, 1968), XII, 218; Louis Schneider, "Some Disgruntled and Controversial Comments on 
the Idea ofCulture in the Social Sciences," Social Sdena Quarterly, Llll (1972), 378; Robert 
C. Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," PolitiCJJl Sdena Quartnly, 
LXXXVIII (197J), 179; Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics, 9; Ruth Lane, "Political 
Culture: Residual Category or General Theory?" Comparative PolitiCJJl Studies, XXV (1992), 
364. 
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culture comprised the "habits, perspectives, and attitudes that exist 
to influence political life"; regional variations in political forms 
resulted directly from "differences in political culture among the 
states." Elazar theorized that the arrival and spread ofEuro-Ameri­
can civilization across the United States from east to west left a 
residual pattern. He isolated and identified the "moralistic" culture 
ofNew England, the "individualistic" culture of the Mid-Atlantic 
region, and the "traditionalistic" culture of the South. These 
Ur-cultures migrated to the "continuing frontier" of the West, 
then to the cities, and finally to the suburbs. Elazar applied 
"cultural geology" to the sediments of human society that these 
migration streams left behind, devising intricate maps of each 
culture's national diffusion. 10 
Few political scientists found Elazar's "American mosaic" 
completely persuasive. Some · rejected his triangular typology in 
favor ofa continuum, but none could agree on which two cultures 
were polar opposites. Some disputed Elazar's terms because his 
categories entailed a type of belief (individualism), a manner of 
belief (traditionalism), and a source of belief (111oralism), which 
made them incommensurable. Elazar devoted considerable effort 
to refine these cultural constructs, never backing down from what 
he considered "the soundness of [his] original thesis." Eventually, 
he inflated it into a grand theory of "the actual way in whi~h the 
art of government is practiced" throughout the United States, 
even insisting that political culture, "an independent variable with 
a dynamic of its own," had caused the Civil War. 11 
Stirred by such extravagant claims, swarms ofdoubting schol­
ars tested Elazar's cultural constructs against such quantitative 
state-level variables as voter turnout, tax rates, per capita spending, 
quality of life, and poll "data of all kinds. The results proved 
10 Samuel C. Patterson, lhe Politial Cultures of the American States," joumal of Politics, 
XXX (1968), 187-209; Daniel J. Elazar, Ammcan Ft!dnalism: A View From tht! Stdtt!s (New 
York. 1972; ul ed.), 8s, 89, 93-127. • 
11 Ira Sharkansky, Jhe Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research Note, " Polity, II 
(1969), 6lr83; Frederick Win, "Does Control FoUow the Dollar? Value Analysis, School 
Policy, and State-Local Linkages, " Publiws, X (1980), ~88; Ellis, Amtrialn Political Culturu · 
York. 1993), r6s-r69; Elazar, ..Afterword: Steps in the Study of American' Political 
"Publitu, X (1980), 127; idem, Tht! Amtrican Mosaic: Tht! Impact of Spaa, Time, and 
Culture em Ammcm. Politics (Boulder, 1994), 219, u; idem, Building TOUidrd Civil War: 
Gmnatiorual Rhythms in .Amerian Politics (Lanham, Md., 1992), 193- 197. See also idem, Citia 
of tht! Praim: TM Mmopolitan Frontier and American Politics (New York, 1990). 
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inconclusive. "For every study that claims to have found Elazar's 
theory vindicated," one survey of this literature observed, "there 
is another that claims to find it of little use. "12 
After a much-heralded birth, the political culture concept had 
mutated into an awkward and unloved scion of political science. 
"Doubts about the approach no doubt arose from its tab-quick 
popularity, its rapidly ·acquired faddishness," reasoned Eckstein, 
and a recent textbook stated, "Rarely has a concept been so 
frequently used and so often contended." Most users had to 
refashion the notion to suit themselves--either employing survey 
data to suggest changes in political culture between ge~ations, 
thereby sidestepping questions of causality or attitudinal"~ribu­
tion, or whittling down the concept into a humble "heuristic 
device" merely to set boundaries for political outcomes. At best, 
culture influenced "preferences" by demarcating the range of 
conceivable alternatives without choosing among them. Too 
often, however, "political culture" served as an academic token 
or a bland cliche. For example, Elazar's friends and foes alike could 
hardly have disagreed that, in the name of political culture, "the 
political attitudes of U.S. citizens vary in important ways on the 
basis of where in the United States they live." ith this sort of 
commonplace wisdom, political culture betrayed its early promise 
as the "scientific theory of democracy. "13 
After political scientists abandoned· the political culture concept, 
historians gave it a new home. Political scientists had tried to 
12 M. Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, Cultural Theory, 242. See also John Kincaid , 
"Dimensions and Effects of America's Political Subcultures," ]ourMI of American Culture, V 
(1982), 84--92; Jody L. Fitzpatrick and Rodney E. Hero, "Political Culture and Political 
Characteristics of the American States: A Consideration of Some Old and New Questions," 
Westmt Political Qu4rtnly, XLI (1988), 145-153. 
13 Eckstein, l«gdrding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (Berkeley, 
1992), 286; Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller, "A Renaissance of Political Culture?" 
Amman]ounuJI ofPolitical Scima, XL (1996), 632-659; Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, 
Ht1W to Compart N ations: Strategies in Compdrati&IC! Politics (Chatham, NJ., 1990; 2d ed.), 68; 
Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase, Political Attion: Mass Participdtion in Five Western Demoaacies 
(Beverly Hills, 1979); Inglehart, The Silmt Rnolution: Clumging Values and Political Style Among 
Westmt Puljics (Princeton, 1977); idem, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, 
1990); Wildavsky, ' Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of 
Preference Fonnation," Amman Political Sciena Review, LXXXI (1987), 3- 21; Eckstein, "A 
Culturalist Theory ofPolitical Change," ibid., LXXXII (1988), 789-804; Roben S. Erikson, 
John P. Mciver, and Gerald C. Wright, Jr., "State Political Culture and Public Opinion, " 
ibid., LXXXI, 813 . 
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observe, dissect, classify, and quantify culture, but U.S. rustorians 
absorbed a more holistic view of it from postwar anthropologists. 
Beyond arts and literature, culture came to encompass the "com­
plex whole" of social organization~piritual belief, political 
institution, traditional practice, ethical value, psychological as­
sumption, folkloric custom, popular entertainment, gender roles, 
material artifacts, and myriad other kaleidoscopic concerns. In­
deed, anthropologists argued among themselves about the "con­
ceptual slovenliness" that plagued their "inordinately swollen" 
construct. Most, however, accepted that the broader definition of 
culture was "a source of illumination, not a veil of obscurity." As 
Berkhofer pointed out, both the postwar American Studies move­
ment and what later drew scorn as "consensus" history resulted 
from similar efforts to trace "manifestations ofbehavior" to cultural 
"ideas and values" in anthropological fashion. 14 
The temptation to quantify culture seduced relatively few 
rustorians, because their subjects, being for the most part dead, 
could not fill out questionnaires. Instead, rustorians immersed 
themselves in texts and applied · (or misapplied) anthropological 
theory as best they could. Many became devotees of Geertz, 
whose ethnographic method of "truck description" sought to 
inscribe words and deeds with phenomenological and contextual 
meaning. Truck description entranced those who already believed 
with Skinner that "the explanation of human action must always 
include--and perhaps even take the form of--an attempt to 
recover and interpret the meanings ofsocial actions from the point 
of view of the agents performing them." In a Weberian para­
14 Alfred L. K.roeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culturt: A Critical .RMN of Concepts and 
~nitions (Cambridge, Mass., 1952); Milton Singer, '"The Concept ofCulture," in Sills (ed.}, 
lntmt4tiotUII Encyclopedia of 1M Social Sdmas, Ill, 527-543; Roger M. Keesing, wrheories of 
Culture," Annual RnMw ofAnthropology, Ill (1974), 73-97; Ward H. Goodenough, "Culture," 
in Levinson and Melvin Ember (eds.), Encyd~dia of Cultural Anthropology (New York, 199()), 
I, 291-297; Schnrider, "Some Disgrunded and Controversial Comments, " 377, 378; Robert 
me, ..Properties ofCulture: An Ethnographic View," in Richard A. Shweder and idml 
C.Jturt TMory: Essays on Mind, SdJ, and Emotion (New York, 1984), 67. See also Sherry 
B. Ortner, -rheory in Anthropology Since the Sixties, " Comparativr Studin in Sonny and 
History, XXVI (1984), 126-166, and the responses in ibid., XXVIII (1986), 356-374. Robert 
F. Berkhofer, Jr., "Clio and the Culture Concept: Some Impressions of a Changing Rela­
tionship in American Historiography," Social Sdnra Qwlrtnly, Llll (1972), 299. See also 
Richard E. Sykes, "Americm Studies and the Concept of Culture: A Theory and Method, " 
Amnium Qu4rtnly, XV '(1963), .253-270; Brian Attebery, "American Studies: A Not So 
Scientific Method," Amnican Qu4rtnly, XLVIII (1996), 316-343. 
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phrase, Geertz postulated that "man is an animal suspended in 
webs of significance he himself has spun," thus declaring that the 
study ofhomo signifoans required impressionistic interpretation, not 
scientific measurement. Focusing on the intersubjective aspects of 
public acts, thick description' became a technique of cultural 
semiotics, or the contextual interpretation ofcultural symbols. With 
it, historians wOVId breathe new life into the political culture 
concept. Historiographical surveys of Geertz's influence tend to 
focus on European cultural historians, but his impact on American 
political historians was no less impressive. 15 
On the surface, cultural semiotics seemed incompatible with 
history because it ignored the origin and evolution of cultural 
symbols. As Biersack put it, in cultural semiotics, "Meaning is 
described, never derived." European historians inclined toward 
Foucault's style of locating symbols (or "representations') in his­
tory rather than Geertz's penchant for ahistoricai description. But 
many political historians in the United States embraced cultural 
semiotics in the I 970s because it promised to liberate them from 
the theoretical legacies ofmaterialism, behavioralism, and idealism, 
which had paralyzed the study ofideology. For de des, materialist 
historians had treated ideology as a rationalization of material 
interest or an outright obfuscation; behavioralists had treated it as 
idiosyncratic, hopelessly subjective, and irrelevant; and idealists 
had treated it as disembodied "thought" with a life of its own, at 
least until the "linguistic tum" enshrined a less transcendental view 
of abstract discourse. Many political historians agreed with Hartz 
that the materialist-ide~st schism distorted ideology's role in 
history by rendering ideas either epiphenomenal or overly deter­
ministic. Many also agreed with such linguistic philosophers as 
1s Some anthropologists take a dim view of these efforts; some historians concm. See the 
symposium, "History and Anthropology: A Dialogue," Historiull Methods, XIX (1986), 1 19­
128; Jean-Christophe Agnew, "History and Anthropology: Scenes from a Marriage," Yale. 
jolml41 of Criticism, Ill (1990), 29-50; Nicholas B. Dirks, "Is Vice Versa? Historical Anthro­
pologies and Anthropological Histories," in Terrence J. McDonald (ed.), The Historic Tum in 
tM Himkm Scintm (Ann Arbor, 1996), I?-SI; Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: 
Sdetted Essafs (N~ Yo rk, 1973), esp. 3-30; Skinner (ed.), The Return of Grand Theory in the 
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537-556; Lynn Hunt, "History Beyond Social Theory, " in David Carroll (ed.) , The States of 
'Theory ": History, Art, and CritUal Discourse (New York, 1990). 
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Austin that b~havioralism either ignored the possibility of "doing 
things with words" or oversimplified human behavior by dJsmiss­
ing intentionality. 16 
Geertz deftly fused ideas, interests, and behavior by treating 
ideology as a socially co~structed "cultural system." Ideology, in 
his view, affected how people perceived and acted on their ma­
terial int_erests; it also shaped political ideas with unspoken assump­
tions that guided behavior. Geertz stressed that ideology was the 
overall context of ''events, behaviors, institutions, or processes," 
rather than the cause (as idealists assumed) or the effect (as mate­
rialists and behavioralists assumed) of social phenomena-includ­
ing politics. The cultural context of politics encompassed 
perception of interest, intention for behavior, and assumption 
behind idea. It inscribed the words and deeds ofparticipants with 
culturally symbolic meanings that analysts endeavored to decipher. 
Of course, historians had to keep in mind "that symbols convey 
multiple meanings and that meaning is construed in different ways 
by different people," as Damton cautioned aspiring Geertzians. 
But the discovery of cultural semiotics helped American historians 
cultivate a renewed appreciation for the symbolic forms of poli­
tics--discourse and practice, voting and speaking, campaigning 
and governing. Political words and deeds became symbolic texts 
susceptible to interpretation for meanings intended by communi­
cators, constructed by audiences, and (though Geertz was weak 
on this point) contested by subaltern groups. 17 
16 Aletta Biersack, ..Local Knowledge, Local History: Geertz and Beyond," in Hunt (ed.), 
TheN~ Cultural History (Berkeley, 1989), 8o. See also IUren Lystr.a, ..Clifford Geertz and 
the Concept ofCulture," Prospms, VIII (1983), 31-47; Eric Kline Silverman, "Clifford Geertz: 
Towards a More •Thick' Undemanding?" in Christopher Tilley (ed.), ReaJing MakrUII 
Culturr: Slructuralism, Hnmmeutics and Post-Siruauralism (Oxford, 1990), 143-145; Peter' 
Clarke, "Ideas and Interests," in Theodore K. Rabb and Robert I. Rotberg (eds.), The N~ 
History: The 1980s arul &yond (Princeton, 1982.); Myron J . Aronoff, "Ideology and Interest: 
The Dialectics ofPolitics," Politiall Anthropology, I (1980), 1-2.9; John E. Toews, "lnteUectual 
History after the Linguistic Tum: The Autonomy of Meaning and the Irreducibility of , 
E~e," Amnican Historiall RM~, XCII (1987), 879-907; Louis Hanz, "The Problem 
o~ticalldeas," in Roland Young (ed.), A~ to the Study ofPolitics (Evanston, 1958); 
John L. Austin, H(IUI to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, Mass., 1962.); John Searle, Sp«df 
Acts: An Esuy in 1M Philosophy of~ (Cambridge, Mass., 1969); Skinner, "On Perform­
ing and Explaining Linguistic Actions," PllilosopltKal Qtuntnly, XXI (1971), 1-2.1. 
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Cultural semiotics allowed historians to describe political ide­
ology without transmuting it into idealist "thought," exaggerating 
it into "hegemony," ·or reducing it to "false consciousness." When 
assessed symbolically, politics became as much a part of culture as 
gender · or religion---social constructions that historians routinely 
subjected to symbolic interpretations. This approach appealeo to 
political historians who recognized that elitist biographies were 
.Passe, but whom its successor, the "new political history," failed 
to satisfy. As confirmed behavioralists, the new political historians 
downplayed "rhetoric" as deceptive, meaningless, and anecdotal. 
Instead, they correlated votirig and census data to build determinist 
models of political action based on "ethnocultural" loyalty. These 
historians stripped objective behavior from subjective context, 
treating voters in poll booths like laboratory rats in mazes; with 
a wave of the slide rule, they dismissed ideology as irrelevant to 
"how democracy works." Cultural semiotics attracted instead 
those historians of politics who agreed that old-fashioned ap­
proaches merely skimmed the surface, but who rejected both the 
old Marxian-materialist and the new ethnocultural-behavioralist 
alternatives. Surely there was more to politics than class conflict 
and correlation coefficients. Armed with Geertz's expansive 
definition of ideology, which shifted his~orical attention to the 
symbolic content of campaign rallies, platform atory, and po­
litical tracts, historians could redeem political culture while doing 
useful work. 18 
"One of the things that everyone .knows but no one can quite 
think how to demonstrate," Geertz pondered, "is that a country's 
politics reflect the design of its culture." With Geertz's help, 
historians cut this Gordian knot by replacing the "behavioral 
orthodoxy" of political science with the classic anthropological 
18 Al)}n G. Bogue, "United States: The 'New' Political History, " in Walter Laqueur and 
George L. Mosse (eds.), The Nnv History (New York, 1967). See also Bogue, Clio and the 
Bitch Goddess: Qwmrifo.arion in American Politic41 History (Beverly Hills, 1983). Richard Jensen, 
"How Democracy Works: The Linkage Between Micro and Macro Political History," joum41 
of SocUJl History, XVI (1983), 31. See also J. Morgan Kousser, ''The Revivalism of Narrative: 
A Response to R ecent Criticisms ofQuantitative History," Social Science History, VIII (1984), 
I 33- 149; Bogue, "Systematic Revisionism and a Generation offerment in American History," 
journal of Contemporary History, XXI (1986), 135- 16.2; idnn, "The Quest for Numeracy: Data 
and Metho& in Atnerican Political History," joum41 of Interdisciplinary History, XXI (1990), 
89-116. 
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theory of culture as unarticulated consciousness-what Kluck­
hohn, in 1943, had called "covert culture," which operates 
through "unstated premises" rather than measurable attitudes. 
Kluckhohn· defined culture as the collection of "premises and 
categories whose influence is greater, rather than less, because they 
are seldom put into words. "19 
Tracking down the unspoken assumptions ofpast politics was 
not a new quest. As early as the 1 940s, long before the discovery 
ofcultural semiotics, ambitious U.S. historians were forging grand 
syntheses of ideology into cultural systems. For their pains, many 
of these writers were branded as "consensus" celebrators, even 
though their intent was not always celebratory. Others showed 
sensitivity to political symbols in the ideology of colonial Virgini­
ans, early national politicians, the followers of Andrew Jackson, 
and the founders of the Republican party. These early works 
anticipated the political culture synthesis, but the watershed in 
historical application of the political culture concept was the 
discovery of republicanism as the ideology that shaped colonial 
American perceptions of British rule in the imperial crisis of the 
eighteenth century.20 . 
For generations, historians had argued about the validity, and 
even the sincerity, of complaints against British rule leading.up to 
the Revolution. It seemed incongruous that a tax increase could 
have provoked a general rebellion against king and country. The 
reinterpretation of revolutionary discourse in light of republican 
symbols and meanings helped historians to see George III's "long 
19 Geenz, lnterpreltJtion of Cultures, 3 1 1; Kluckhohn, "Coven Culture and Administrative 
Problems," American Anthropologist, XLV (1943), 218; idem, Mirror for Man: The Relation of 
Anthropology to Motkm Lifo (New York, 1949), 3.5· See also Kluckhohn and William H . KeUy, 
"The Concept ofCulture," in Ralph Linton (ed.), The Science ofMan in the World Crisis (New 
York, 194.5); LeVine, ..Properties ofCulture, " 76-77. ' 
20 Richard HofStadter, The American Politiclll Tradition and the Mm Who Made It (New York, 
1948); Hartz, The Libnal Tradition in Amnia~: An lntnpretation of Amnia~n Political Th~mght 
Since 1M Revolution (New York, 19.5.5); Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation :. The 
United SIIJtfS in Historic41 and Comparatiw Pmpectiw (New York, 1963); Daniel Boorstin, The 
.Amnicmu (New York, 19.58-73), 3v; Charles S. Sydnor, Amnia~n Revolutionaries in the Malting : 
Politiclll Ptaaias in Washington 's Virginia (New York, 1962); Edmund S. Morgan, American 
~.American Frtedom: The Ortkal of Colonial Virginia (New York. 197.5); Ho&tadter, The 
Idea ofa Patty Systmt: The Rise ofLegitimate Opposition in the U nited States, 178o-t840 (Berkeley, 
· John William Ward, Andmv Jadtson : Symbol for an Age (New York, 19.5.5); Marvin 
M The }«Jtsonian Persuasion: Politics and &lief (Stanford, 19.57); Eric Foner, Free Soil, 
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1970). 
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train· of abuses" from the patriots' perspective as a monstrous 
conspiracy against liberty and a harbinger of corruption. Bailyn 
and his students drew on cultural semiotics to stress that revolu­
tionary leaders and a' great many followers perceived British policy 
as "a deliberate assault launched surreptitiously by plotters against · 
liberty." Through the republican lens, American rebels "saw be­
hind the actions of the English ministry . . . not merely misgov­
ernment . . . but a deliberate design to destroy the constitutional 
safeguards of liberty, which only concerted resistance-violent 
resistance if necessary-could effectively oppose.'' Intellectual his­
torians also help_ed articulate republicanism to recapture the mean­
ing ofsymbol-laden words like tyranny, corruption, liberty, and virtue 
in their original setting and to reinterpret the Revolution from 
the revolutionaries' point of view.21 
Predictably, materialist historians denounced the republican­
ism thesis as "ideological determinism.'' Failing to appreciate the 
subtlety of political culture as a perceptual context and a semio­
logical system, not a cause, these critics mistook republicanism for 
a "consensus" theory that attributed the Revolution to the writings 
of"Great White Men." Undaunted, Bailyn's students kept spread­
ing the gospel of political culture, urging colleagues to recognize 
that public expressions of political ideas "meant something very 
real to both the writers and their readers," and that revolutionary 
rhetoric deserved renewed attention for evidence of forgotten 
meanings. Bailyn himself nominated Geertz as a otential media­
tor for political historians divided between materialism, behav­
ioralism, and idealism. "Formal discourse becomes politically 
powerful when it becomes ideology," he asserted-that is, when 
. 
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it "shapes what is otherwise instinctive and directs it to attainable 
goals; when it clarifies, symbolizes, and elevates to structured 
consciousness the mingled urges that stir within us." Wood, 
Bailyn's student, likewise echoed Geertz in affirining that· the 
"meanings~' people gave to their political actions were "never 
epiphenomenal" and that "all human behavior can only be un­
derstood and explained, indeed can only exist, in terms of the 
meanings it has. "22 
Republicanism advanced the cause of political culture with 
historians, but family quarrels about the relationships between 
republicanism, liberalism, and labor radicalism still had to be 
settled. Accusatory footnotes abounded, as historians sought to 
prove the predominance of increasingly abstract viewpoints. Tay­
lor complained that the republicanism debate seemed to "describe 
categories that were, at best, dimly apprehended by people in the 
past," a sadly ironic outcome for political culture's historiographi­
cal debut, given that the concept was supposed to reinfuse past 
perspectives into the study of past politics. 23 
If nothing else, the debate proved that historians, unlike 
political scientists, would not demand scientific rigor from their 
adopted concept. Historians refrained from flinging statistics at 
each other. Despite its flaws and controversies, the republicanism 
thesis successfully grafted cultural semiotics onto American politi­
cal history. As Silbey put it, at least historians of republicanism 
tried to describe "things that link a people together politically, 
their shared values, memories, and perspectives" within a holistic 
framework, and Rogers, in an otherwise critical review, cited 
22 Staughton Lynd, "Tories and Neo-Whi~." Reviews in Amt'ril4n History, I (1973), 204; 
Jesse Lemisch, "The American Revolution Bicentennial and the Papen ofGreat White Men," 
AHA Newskttn 9 (November 1971), 7-21. For an overview of the "Great White M~n" 
critique, see Ruth H. Bloch, "Radical Whi~ Revisited: Reflections upon Bernard Bailyn's 
Tlw I~ Origins oftM Amnicml Revolution," lrrtdkaaull History Newskttn 1.5 (1993), 14-22. 
Bailyn, ltkologWI Origins, ix; idmr, "Central Themes," 1 1; Gordon S. Wood, "lnteUectual 
History and the Social Sciences," in Higham and Conkin (eds.), N~ Dirrctions in Amt'rican 
lrrtdkthull History, 32. See also Wood, "The Creative Imagination of Bernard Bailyn," in 
James A. Henretta, Michael Kanunen, and Stanley N . lUtz (eds.), T~ Transfomu~tion of Early 
Amtrican Hist«y (New York, 1991). ' 
23 Alan Taylor, ..Imperative Categories," Reviews irr American History, XIX (1991), 3.5~· For 
the barest outlines of these republicanism debates, see Lance Banning, ..Jdfersonian Ideology 
Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic," William and Mary 
~. XLIII (1986), 3-19; Joyce Appleby, Libnalism and Republicanism in tht Historical 
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republicanism's "investment of language and culture with coher­
ence and social power. ''24 
Answering the "consensus" canard, political culture historians be­
gan to refocus the .concept from the natio~ to specific groups. 
Holt and Greenberg described the advent of the Civil War from 
the perspective of Northern and Southern politicians-both sides 
viewing themselves as defenders of republican virtue. Howe 
analyzed the partisan political culture of antebellum Whigs, de­
claring a Ia Geertz that "the mood, metaphors, values, and style 
of Whig political attitudes mattered.'' Howe profiled prominent 
politicians, not because they were "Great White Men," but be­
cause they were useful informants who "would reveal the fullest 
development and elaboration of Whig culture." Baker conferred 
comparable attention on Pemocrats in the antebellum North, 
drawing upon anthropological theory to describe partisan "tribal 
rites." Like Howe, Baker relied on prominent "informants," but 
her methodological breakthrough was to treat "voting as a sym­
bolic demonstration," the American equivalent ofGeertz's famous 
Balinese cockfight that is, the essential ritual of a culture. At a 
time when other political historians poured over election returns 
and census manuscripts, Baker set her sights on "metaphorical 
language and political iconography," asking "what voting meant 
in a collective sense," rather than piling up more decontextualized 
statistics.25 
Soon a great many U.S. historians adopted e political cul­
ture concept as their own. Reviewers found the approach "stun­
ning in its originality," for it "include(d] everyone who 
participated in politics," turning historians into mass mind readers. 
Political culture captured "popular belie'rs and expectations that 
gave meaning to the political process and guided the conduct of 
24 Joel H. Silbey, "Conclusion," in Uoyd E. Ambrosius (ed.), A Crisis of Republicanism: 
Amoican Politics in IN Civil War Era (Lincoln, 1990), 129; Daniel T . Rogers, "Republicanism: 
the Career of a Concept," )outn~~l of Ammcan History, LXXJX (1992), 37. For a more 
sympathetic review ofrepublicanism. see James T . Kloppenberg, "Republicanism in American 
History and Historiography," ToetpUVille Rmftv, XIII (1992}, 1 19-136. 
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POLITICAL CULTURE I Z41 
politics and government." With this concept, historians could 
recover the "manners," "intellectual atmosphere," and "percep­
tions" of past political figures, though temporal . change did not 
enter into their analyses until Watson chose the transition from 
the first to the second party system to link economic development 
to shifts in antebellum political culture. "In the process, he dem­
onstrated that the retrieval of submerged patterns of belief need 
not entail ·any presumptions ofimmutability. Formisano examined 
the same transition more thoroughly, describing how genteel 
"electioneering" gave way to rough-and-tumble "campaigning" 
in Massachusetts. He unearthed "the taken-for-granteds" of po­
litical discourse by combining sources about "community life" 
with statistical analysis-but without inferring ideas from be­
havior.26 . 
In the 1990s, Ethington's account ofSan Francisco's shift from 
"republican liberalism" to "pluralist liberalism" arid Bond's tracking 
of white Mississippi's "social ethic" have ·added sophisticated dia­
chronic analysis to political culture history. In this spirit, Wiebe's 
Self-Rule offers a sweeping narrative of the transition from active, 
high-turnout democracy in the nineteenth-century United States 
to passive, low-turnout democracy in the twentieth century. 
Women and non-whites were proscribed from politics, Wiebe 
freely admits, but for the white-male masses, the nineteenth cen­
tury was a democratic golden · age of "self-determination" when 
"people ruled themselves" both individually and collectively. 27 
This edenic era ended with the urban-industrial transforma­
tion that brought "centralization and hierarchy." In the early 
twentieth century, a new "national class" of reformers, business­
men, and intellectuals wielded scientific expertise .to isolate po­
. 
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litical power from the masses. Wiebe charges the progressive · 
movement with the crime of "atomizing the electorate "-forcing 
voters to abandon partisan identities in order to cast their ballots 
as "an individualized private act." No ionger did elections function 
as fraternal celebrations of shared identity. Mter I 920, faced with 
the necessity of "ab~orbing increasing amounts of information on 
a multiplying array ofissues," fewer and fewer Americans straggled 
to the polls, and voter turnout fell from over So percent in the 
I 88os to barely 50 percent a century later. 28 
Wiebe tells a familiar story with two new twists. First, 
where;15 some historians argue that the "decline of popular poli­
tics" was an unintended consequence of reform, Wiebe is less 
charitable. "If most progressives did not set out to keep the poor 
from the polls," he writes with scorn, "they had little invested in 
bringing them there." Elitist reformers "tolerated lower-class ex­
clusion" if they did not actively seek it. In this respect, Self-Rule 
is a sequel to Wiebe's acclaimed classic, The Search for Order, 
1877-1920, because it extendS to the present his saga of centralized 
bureaucracy displacing popular self-government. In both works, 
however, Wiebe seems to romanticize blind party loyalty, bossism, 
and corrupt political machines because they, at least, yielded high 
turnouts. He might have devoted more attention to the differ­
ence between genuine "self-rule" and its illusion under boss rule, 
or to the democratic potential of the rational, non-partisan, issue­
oriented politics that progressives hoped to create. But Wiebe 
doubts that voters need to know much about issues: "Even if we 
accept the implausible proposition that a determinate body of 
knowledge lies out there to be learned," he writes, "why should 
citizens be obliged to sit there and learn it?" Given this attitude, 
it is not surprising th~t Wiebe finds nineteenth- ntury elections, 
which Henry George called "glittering displays of partisanship," 
more compelling than the bland information-overload of modem 
campaigns.29 · 
28 Wiebe, ibid., 253, 13fr137, 17fr177, ~~passim. 
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The second new twist to Wiebe's "cultural history ofAmeri­
. can democracy" is his pointed invocation of "culture." Sounding 
like a comparative politics scholar in the Almond-Verba tradition, 
Wiebe defines democracy as "invariably popular self-government 
and variably something else--something culturally specific that 
has adhered to it." Sounding like a Geertzian ethnographer, he 
wants to explore "the webbing of values and relations" spun 
within American democracy. Seemingly a culturalist, not a be­
havioralist, Wiebe declares that "my study is situated at the inter­
section b.etween beliefs and actions," steering between "a 
systematic history of ideas on one .side and a detailed history of 
political behavior on the other." Yet, except for brief forays into 
exposing sundry political theorists as closeted anti-democrats, 
Wiebe does not engage the rhetorical conventions, unspoken 
assumptions, and significant symbols of past politics as would a 
true student of cultural semiotics. Although Self-Rule is a power­
fully argued brief for democratic revitalization, its invocation of 
political culture terminology seems gratuitous. Despite claims to 
the contrary, Wiebe's real concern is behavioralist, not culturalist: 
voter turnout, not the meanings and discourse of politics, is for 
him the measure of democracy. "At some point on a curve of 
declining turnouts," he writes, "the system no longer functions." 
Indeed, he dismisses Almond and Verba's theory of political cul­
ture precisely because it ignores issues of voting behavior and 
turnout.30 
Other historians combining chronological narratives with 
cultural comparisons have applied the political culture concept to 
symbols and ideology rather than to functions and behaviors. This 
approach seems to hold the most promise for scholarly exploration 
of political culture. Two decades ago, Kelley helped point the 
way by retracing the transmigration of social groups between the 
Jeffersonian/Democratic and Whig/Republican party coalitions. 
Freeman later offered a more ideologically oriented comparison 
of the styles, traditions, and worldviews of the two major parties. 
More recendy, Baker, Sklar, and McCurry have produced major 
studies of women's political culture in the nineteenth- and *rly 
twentieth-century United States, emphasizing that the franchise 
was not a necessary precondition to public political participation 
and comparing the gendered assumptions that men and women 
30 W iebe, Sdf-Ruk, 9-10, 2 57. 220 . 
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brought to the political arena. These authors imply that the 
modem welfare state gradually replaced the older laissez-faire state 
at least partly because male political culture lost its monopoly on 
formal power. Now that historians have placed political elites in 
context alongside diverse masses ofcultural contestants, no longer 
can political culture history be said to dwell exclusively on "Great 
White Men."31 
Whether inspired by Elazar's work.i~ political science, or by 
Frederick Jac~on Turner's frontier thesis, American historians 
have also begun to connect migration patterns with geographical 
variations in political culture. Etcheson's Emerging Midwest com­
pares the ideologies of southern and northern migrants in ante~ 
bellum Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Following the trend toward 
integration ofboth comparative and diachronic analysis, Etcheson 
discusses how the events leading to the Civil War sundered 
state-level polities already divided between two regnant political 
cultures. Shared ideologies of republicanism, partisanism, and 
"westemness" could not withstand the resurgence of sectional 
loyalties in the 1850s. Like Bond, who reconstructed the meaning 
of "liberty" and "virtue" for whit~ Mississippians, and Greenberg, 
who likened the interpretation o( political culture to "a work of 
translation," Etcheson shows a keen sensitivity to language, closely 
reading the key terms "private interest" and "public good" in 
context. She adds that historians need not dwell on whether 
political rhetoric was ever sincere, because, in any case, its users ­
were "aware of public sensibilities and community values." In a 
democracy, since successful candidates "win office by appealing . 
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to assumptions shared with the electorate," historians can "depend 
on politicians to be articulate voices of the political culture," 
regardless of ulterior motives. With these words, Howe and 
Baker's pioneering reliance on prominent informants in the study 
of political culture now stands vindicated. 32 
These impressive new contributions to American historiog­
raphy bring political culture to fruition. Yet, not every historian 
is satisfied. For example, Lotchin allows that "political culture 
seems to be about ideas," but he objects that the concept "fails to 
link specific political outcomes to specific attitudes," fretting that 
"without outcomes we cannot fully understand politics. ''33 
Perhaps the problem is that American historians are offering 
ever-thicker descriptions of politics by invoking the term; "po­
litical culture," without adequate definition or focus. Sometimes 
it seems to denote not political symbols in context but minute 
procedural dissections of nominations, campaigns, patronage, and 
officeholding. Other times, it seems to encompass "common 
assumptions" about everything from "the legitimacy of the politi­
cal process in general" tq "the role of government in particular." 
Eager proponents have used the concept to investigate diverse 
matters, ranging from antebellum literary metaphors and the ori­
gins of New Deal liberalism to abolitionist fairs and George 
Washington's personality cult. Like political scientists before them, 
incautious historians are somewhat in danger of turning political 
culture into an indiscriminate uncaused cause once ag.iin.34 
32 On migration and political culture, see also Aaron Spencer Fogleman, Ho~l journeys: 
Gmnan Immigration, &ttlnnmt, and Politiad Cultu~ in Colonial Amnica, 1717-177j (Phi' delplm, 
1996). Bond, Politiad Cultu~ in~ NiMt«nth-Cmtury South, 81-1 14; Greenberg, Honor and 
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Religion in Jeffersonian Ohio," in Jeftiey P. Brown and idnn (eds.), The Pursuit of Public 
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3 3 Roger W. Lotcbin, '"The Political Culture ofthe Merropolitan-Military Complex," Social 
Scinta History, XVI (1992), 278-279; idem, book review, jounutl ofAmnican History, LXXXII 
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Certain of political culture's early champions have recanted. 
"The need for conceptual clarity is not mere semantics," wrote 
Formisano, and Baker complained that, too often, "political cul­
ture serves as gloss." The concept appears least promising to those 
whose explanatory frameworks privilege class conflict and objec­
tive conditions ·over ideology and subjective beliefs. Historians 
who prefer "political economy" to political culture, and who are 
more likely to invoke Antonio Gramsci than Geertz when they 
write about ideology, often accuse political culture historians of 
constructing static, univocal models, although they do not neces­
sarily hesitate to construct their own in the name of"hegemony. ''35 
The concept has failed to ~ring about a paradigm shift becau·se 
it has not been able to subsume the conflicts between materialism, 
behavioralism, and idealism. Nonetheless, political· culture's antici­
pation of the burgeoning "public sphere" literature, in its focus 
on publicly negotiated meanings, suggests its continued relevance. 
Public-sphere participants couch their arguments in symbols that 
are amenable to interpretation by historians who would have- their 
Habermas with a grain ofGeertz. Political culture also has a place 
in the larger movement toward cultural history that Kelley de­
scribes as a "phenomenological critique" of behavioralism.36 
Political Culture in Upstate New York During the 17CJ05,"journal ofAmerican History, LXXIX 
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Political c.ulture, as construed in both political science and 
history, underscores "the importance ofvalues, feelings, and beliefs 
in the explanation of political behavior." Just as the concept drew 
political scientists like Rosenbaum into "the underlying psycho­
. logical forces that shape much of civic life," it drew historians like 
Howe into the "political psychology" of past politics. Verba w~nt 
looking not for "what is happening in the world of politics, but 
[for] what people believe about those happenings," and he re­
cruited historians as well as political scientists in his quest. No 
longer must political scientists assume that "culture does not exist 
or is not important"; nor must political historians conjure up 
"ethnocultures" from mute statistics of behavior. The charge that 
the political culture concept tends toward imprecision is not 
without merit. Yet, despite its analytical expansiveness, the con­
cept represents a valuable check on the assumption that political 
scientists and historians are "objective" observersY 
One controversial trait has haunted the concept since its 
political-~cience origins. "The study ofpolitical culture," observed 
Dittmer, "has since its beginnings been in the vanguard of the 
behavioral revolution in political science." Once Almond and 
Verba introduced statistical tables into political culture studies, 
everyone followed suit. Ironically, Almond ended up renouncing 
the "behavioral revolution," and Verba warned that a ballot was 
"a rather blunt instrument" for reconstructing a voter's mentality. 
But most of their followers continued reducing politics to quan­
tiftable variables. It remained for interpretivist historians to go 
where behavioralists in both disciplines feared to tread, combining 
cultural semiotics with textual sources. 38 · 
37 Almond, "The Study of Political Culture," in idem (ed.), A Discipline Divided: Schools and 
Sects in Political Scim« (Newbury Park, Calif., 1990), 143; Walter A. Rosenbaum, PolitiCJJI 
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Wurld Politics, XXIX (1977), ssJ. See also Farr, "Remembering the Revolution: Behavioral­
ism in American Political Science," in idmt, John S. Dryzek, and Stephen T . Leonard (eds.), 
Political Sciena in History: &~arch Programs and PolitiaJI Traditions (New York, 199S). For a 
r.Kiical critique ofbehavioralism, see Timothy W . Luke, "Political Science and the Discourses 
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Grad.ually the news filtered back to political scientists that 
historians had done well by political culture. Adams excitedly 
informed his colleagues that "the non-scientific practitioners of 
interpretation have something to say to political scientists about 
the task ofunderstanding the place and production of meaning in 
politics." He pleaded for cultural semiotics in the study ofpolitical 
culture: "Political meaning is born not just in what individual 
subjects consciously think and value politically, but in cultural. and 
intersubjective symbols, in collective meanings inscribed in the 
symbolic texts of political practices themselves." Though no fan 
of Geertz, Merelman agreed that "if political scientists are to 
continue to talk about 'political culture' ... they should attend 
to contemporary anthropology. ''39 
In the 1990s, political scientists, like historians, have begun 
to look beyond quantitative behavioralism to cultural semiotics. 
Brint urges his colleagues to seek "meaning" in politics revealed 
not by polls but by "the social and discursive practices of a 
culture." They should learn "the cultural grammar or narrative of 
a polity-the internal coherence of its social, cultur;U, and discur­
sive practices." Elkins echoes historians by defining political cul­
ture as "a framework for action rather than a set ofspecific actions 
or beliefS. It consists of largely unspoken assumptions about the 
world so 'taken for granted' most of the time that they have 
become 'second nature."' Learning "cultural grammar" and "un­
spoken assumptions" requires textual interpretation informed by 
anthropological theory rather than sample surveys or correlation 
coefficients.40 
Some political scientists prefer Mary Douglas to Geertz as · 
their anthropologist ofchoice, but their interpretations ofpolitical 
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action are couched in language that . participants would have 
difficulty understanding. Other political scientists follow historians 
in adopting Geertz's less structuralist approach precisely because 
ofits intelligibility. From this camp, Laitin counsels that "historical 
(contextual) analysis," combined with a "richer notion of culture, 
one built upon the Geertzian framework," is the key to political 
culture· research.41 
A recent survey of the field by Welch, a British political 
scientist, n~tes approvingly that "political culture as used and 
developed within American historiography has begun to fulfill 
some of the promise of a phenomenological approach." Welch 
appreciates .historians because "a researcher investigating the past 
with the tool ofpolitical culture is much less constrained than one 
investigating it with a view to justifying this or that theory of 
comparative politics." The problem, he reali~es, is that "the em­
pirical bounty offered by the attitude survey has encouraged 
behavioral political scientists to imagine they have the fullest 
conception of political culture, and has distracted them from the 
more fertile modes of inquiry to which historians have perforce 
been led." Welch admires how American historians escaped "the 
necessity of choosing between interests and culture as explana­
tions, instead using political culture to transcend that dichotomy." 
No longer need students ofpolitics argue about the relative weight 
,._
of ideas, interests, and behavior; political culture is the context of 
politics itself-the structure of meaning through which political 
participants develop ideas, perceive interests, and act on both. 
Political culture, as applied by historians, provides "a means of 
connecting the analyst's thick description with the self-under­
standings of the participants," and this connection is what com­
parative politics has always lacked. 42 
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When political culture was still in its conceptual infancy 
within political science, Hitchner argued that it should be nour­
ished with historical analysis, not survey data. Political culture 
· offered great analytical potential, but if the "methodological in­
clination" to rely solely on supposedly "scientific" data persisted, 
"we ?re headed for some trouble." Hitchner wanted his colleagues 
to become historians of the political cultures that they studied. He 
believed that "to discard the ever important dimension of history 
is truly to cut us adrift from reality. There is a wisdom in our past 
to which we must always listen." Historians, not political scientists, 
turned out to be the better listeners. Indeed, many political sci­
entists-using the political culture concept still rely on poll data, 
but, among historians, cultural (or "public sphere") approaches are 
gradually supplanting quantitative behavioralism. "We have not 
begun to understand our political history sufficiently," Levine 
recently admonished, "because we too frequently artificially sepa­
rated it from the larger cultural context of which it was a part." 
Perhaps that artificial separation has ended. "Historiographically," 
acknowledges Silbey, a prominent behavioralist, "we live in an 
age of political culture. "4J 
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